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Abstract
There are legal grounds to hear competitors in merger control proceedings,
and competitor involvement has gained significance. To what extent this
is economically sensible is the focus of our game-theoretic analysis. The
competition authority applies some welfare standard while the competitor
cares about its own profit. In expectation, there is neither a pure con-
flict nor a complete alignment of interest. We distinguish hard and soft
information and ask whether hearing the competitor might convey valuable
but non-verifiable information to the authority. We find that the author-
ity will mostly have to ignore the competitor’s cheap talk but, depending
on the authority’s own prior information, strictly following the competi-
tor’s selfish recommendation can improve the authority’s decision. Under
a consumer welfare standard, non-verifiable information should be ignored.
Complementary to our analysis, we provide empirical data of competitor in-
volvement in EU merger cases and give an overview of the legal discussion
in the EU and US.
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1. Introduction
Both in the European Union (EU) and the U.S., competitors have gained
significance in merger control proceedings. EU merger law presently en-
titles competitors to submit their views on the notified merger in writing
and in a formal hearing before the European Commission (Commission)
makes a final decision. Additionally, competitors have been increasingly
involved in the Commission’s fact-finding and market investigation process.
In the U.S., competitors’ claims were traditionally treated restrictively but
both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have
recently started to widen the extent of competitor participation in merger
proceedings by conducting an ‘open door’ policy.
These recent procedural developments in merger control have motivated us
to explore potential policy deficiencies which might arise out of a conflict
between legal due process and economic efficiency aspects: while, on the
one hand, we have regulatory, procedural and practical reasons to take
into account the competitors’ opinions such as their legal right to be heard
or the authority’s past heavy reliance on third-party input resulting from
its information deficit due to limited resources; on the other hand, from
an efficiency standpoint, there is reason to believe that a certain degree of
temptation exists on the part of the competitors to manipulate the authority
so as to achieve a decision maximizing their own profits rather than total
welfare.
Our goal in this paper is twofold. First, we document the growing signif-
icance and the legal discussion of competitor involvement in merger pro-
ceedings in the EU and the U.S. This is complemented by empirical data
of EU merger cases. Second, we introduce and analyze two tractable game-
theoretical models for the strategic interaction between competitors and the
competition authority.
We are particularly interested in the communication of subjective and non-
verifiable information between the competitor and the authority. We employ
cheap talk signaling games in which the competitor communicates with the
authority. This communication is costless and non-binding and its content
is not verifiable. It has no direct consequences but, depending on how
it affects the authority’s beliefs about the merger implications, it might
reveal valuable information or it might be used to deceive the authority.
The authority decides to either clear or block the merger based on its own,
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mostly verifiable, information and the competitor’s message. This includes
the option to ignore the competitor’s communication.
Our two signaling models differ by the richness of the signaling language: In
the first model the language is rich enough to communicate the full welfare
and profit implications of clearing the notified merger. In the second, the
language is just rich enough to recommend to either block or clear the
merger.
We determine all perfect Bayesian pure- and mixed-strategy equilibria of
the two signaling institutions. These turn out to be not substantially differ-
ent between the two games. They can be partitioned into equilibria where
the authority ignores the competitor’s message and takes a decision based
on its own (verifiable) information only, and equilibria where it implements
the competitor’s preferred decision. In the latter case, the authority’s deci-
sion is always superior, by the welfare standard applied, as compared to a
decision under ignorance of the competitor’s cheap talk. The situations in
which the authority should ‘listen’ rather than ‘hear’ are characterized by a
sufficient expected alignment of interest. They can easily be identified from
the authority’s own prior information.
However, we argue that these situations are very unlikely to occur, especially
so under a consumer welfare standard. This might provide a justification
for the consumer welfare standard: under this standard, is seems clear that
soft information should not be relied upon.
Relevant legal and economic literature is mentioned throughout the pa-
per. Section 2 discusses the legal background and the procedural aspects of
hearing competitors’ views; Section 3 describes the model and the games;
Sections 4 and 5 present the pure- and mixed-strategy equilibria of the first
signaling game, respectively. Section 6 contains the results for the second
signaling game. Section 7 provides a discussion of the results as well as our
policy recommendation. Section 8 concludes. The appendix contains all
lemmas and proofs, and empirical data on EU merger cases.
2. Competitor Involvement in Merger Control
2.1. European Union
Competitor involvement in EU merger control is explicitly set forth in the
European merger law provisions: Within 7–10 days after receiving a merger
notification the Commission sends out Article 112 letters to the filing par-
2Merger Regulation 139/2004.
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ties and ‘interested third parties’. The law defines the latter usually as
being competitors, suppliers and customers.3 The so-called Article 11 let-
ters’ main purpose is to gather information on the market in Phase 1. The
Best Practice Guidelines further set forth that the Commission may con-
sult third parties on methodological issues regarding data and information
gathering in the relevant economic sector.4 Third parties showing sufficient
interest may request in Phase 1 to be heard orally.
In Phase 2, the Commission sends to the involved third parties a non-
confidential version of the Statement of Objections5 after which the third
parties have the right to express their view in writing or orally in a formal
hearing.6
Finally, the Commission states in its Best Practice Guidelines that it wel-
comes any individual submission apart from direct replies from question-
naires where third parties provide ‘information and comments’ considered
relevant for the merger assessment. It may also invite those parties for
meetings to discuss or clarify such issues further.7
The prevailing view among scholars and practitioners is that in most cases,
the Commission will lack the internal market expertise upon receiving a
notification, thereby granting a ‘considerable scope’ of comment to and
relying heavily on the information provided by the third parties.8 Hearing
Officers Durande and Williams of the Cabinet of the Commissioner agree
that although the right for a formal hearing may in principle be denied
by the Commission, the rights of the ‘other involved third parties’ which
includes competitors must be considered as being much closer to those of a
defendant in terms of procedural guarantees.9
3Art. 11(c) of the Regulation 802/2004 (Implementing Regulation) implementing the
Merger Regulation 139/2004, i.e., setting forth details on notifications, time limits, and
hearings.
4Best Practices on the conduct of EC merger control proceedings 2004, para 28.
5Art. 16(1) Implementing Regulation.
6Art. 16 and 18 Implementing Regulation.
7para. 35.
8Van Bael & Bellis (2005, p. 861); Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton (2004, p. 4).
9as compared to rights of a complainant in antitrust matters. See Durande and
Williams (2005, p. 22).
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2.2. U.S.
The U.S. have been traditionally more reserved in granting rights to com-
petitors in merger proceedings. The responsible authorities, the U.S. De-
partment of Justice (DoJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), took
the view that competitors were more likely to complain about mergers which
would render the market more competitive post merger.10 To competitors
who tried to challenge a merger by way of an injunction11 or sue for dam-
ages, the Supreme Court usually denied standing to the competitors.12
However, while the DoJ and FTC were once resistant to hear competitors
in pending merger proceedings, the practice has markedly changed in recent
years. The most prominent case was AT&T Inc.’s contemplated acquisition
of T-Mobile USA, Inc. in 2011.13 Competitors Sprint Nextel and Cellular
South opposed the merger and the agencies supported their efforts in gain-
ing access to the documents relating to the merger.14 After their strong
objections which were also supported by the U.S. and several states, AT&T
ultimately abandoned its efforts to acquire T-Mobile USA.
Given the recent shift in the agencies’ stance towards competitors, practi-
tioners in the U.S. have become conscious about the ‘right strategy’ com-
petitors could take in merger proceedings, stating that the bigger role in
merger review ‘necessitates an additional layer of planning and strategy’.15
2.3. Legal and Strategic Considerations in Competitor Involvement
Apart from information-gathering purposes, the involvement of competitors
as set forth by EU laws is partly motivated by the legal principle of grant-
ing anyone the right to be heard before an individual measure which would
affect such person adversely is taken16 and partly by due process consid-
erations. Legislators and legal scholars might have taken the view upon
drafting the rules that the competitors would always report truthfully to
10Diesenhaus (1987, p. 2059); Van Arsdall and Piehl (2014).
11Sec. 16 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26.
12Cargill v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 107 S.Ct. 484 (1986).
13AT&T Inc., Description of Transaction, Public Interest Showing and Related Demon-
strations, WT Docket No. 11-65 at 1, FCC filed April 21, 2011.
14See detailed case discussion in Hundt (2011); Stucke and Grunes (2012, p. 196).
15Van Arsdall and Piehl (2014, p. 2).
16Art. 41 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
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the deciding agency. A competitor raising serious doubts about a merger
would thus be a reason to view the merger more critically.
While the competitors’ right to be heard can be seen as a softer version
of the usual rights of defense,17 practice shows that their participation is
crucial if not essential in merger proceedings, as their involvement in Phase
2 proceedings shows:
We have looked into all Phase 2 proceedings between 1990 and 2013 and
identified those cases where competitors were given the opportunity to voice
their opinions.18 As can be seen in Figure 1 which plots the ratio between
competitor participation and Phase 2 cases, competitor involvement has
radically increased since the reform and the ratio has stayed continuously
at 1. One can assume presently that all Phase 2 proceedings will entail the
involvement of competitors, whereas in the past that was not necessarily
the case.
Figure 1: Competitor participation as a share of Phase 2 cases, EU, 1990–2013
We have further plotted the ratio of competitor objections to only those
17Durande and Williams (2005, p. 23).
18The data has been collected by reviewing each Commission’s decision in the
relevant timespan which can be downloaded from the Commission’s webpage:
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/. See Appendix B for additional em-
pirical data.
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Phase 2 cases where competitors have been involved for the years from 1997
until 2013, see Figure 2. In other words, only those instances were captured
where competitors had a negative opinion on the merger proposed. As can
be seen, competitors have been increasingly voicing concerns in the past
years. Could it be because competitors have realized the strategic potential
in merger proceedings or because more competition-enhancing mergers have
been notified in the past years which did not find the competitors’ approval?
Figure 2: Competitor objections as a share of Phase 2 cases with competitor involvement,
EU, 1997–2013
In any case, scholars and practitioners now agree that competitors’ opin-
ions in merger proceedings shall be viewed with skepticism (see, e.g., Motta,
2004, p. 240). The Commission has recently proceeded to add in its deci-
sions a footnote saying that information furnished by third parties will not
be taken at face value since ‘the opinion provided might be biased to in-
fluence [its] decision-making process.’ The footnote further states that the
Commission will thus analyze competitors’ opinions very carefully as they
‘might have an interest in making the transaction of their competitors [...]
more difficult[...]’.19
The FTC stated already 25 years ago in an amicus brief that competitors
‘stand to benefit from, and have no incentive to challenge, acquisitions that
19See for example the decision in Ryanair/Aer Lingus III, M.6663, Feb. 27, 2013, para
28, footnote 18.
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may lead to supracompetitive pricing. [They] have a substantial incentive to
challenge acquisitions that will make their rivals more efficient, make their
industry more competitive, and reduce the prices they can charge their cus-
tomers. [...] [Competitors must be] prevented from using the antitrust laws
for anticompetitive purposes.’20
At the same time, the authorities are by definition market outsiders and
must to some extent rely on the information provided by market insiders.
They further face time and cost constraints which make it even more difficult
to assess the state of a market or to anticipate the implication of a proposed
merger on the market. Once competitors are playing a role in the market
assessment, however, there is a potential risk for strategic abuse of the
legal possibility to express their opinions by sending distorted signals to the
authorities in order to promote their own interests (Motta, 2004, p. 240).21
It has long been recognized that mergers generally exhibit a tradeoff be-
tween market power effects that tend to reduce welfare, and synergy effects
that might increase welfare. For the competitors, the market power effect is
supposed to be profit-increasing, as they can free-ride on the merging firms’
output reduction, while synergy effects tend to reduce prices and there-
fore hurt the competitors’ profits (see, e.g., Stigler, 1950, Williamson, 1968,
Perry and Porter, 1985).
For a given notified merger, it is difficult to say to what extent the com-
petitors’ and the authority’s interests are aligned because both, the market
power effect and some synergy effects, can be expected to be present in
most mergers (Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu, 2011, p. 985).
Moreover, there is a large theoretical and empirical literature on merg-
ers reporting very diverse effects with respect to welfare as well as insider
and outsider profits depending on which aspects are relevant for a given
merger.22 Neven and Röller (2002) recall that, based on standard oligopoly
20Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae,
Cargill v. Monfort.
21Harker, Hviid, and Wright (2011) criticize competitors’ preferential treatment under
EU standing rules and argue that competitors’ challenges often have strategic motives
which are detrimental to consumer welfare.
22Farrell (2012, p.22) stresses that “industries and their participants are endlessly id-
iosyncratic”. Examples of such aspects are collusion (Miller and Weinberg, 2014), quan-
tity vs. price competition (Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds, 1983, Deneckere and Davidson,
1985), synergies (Banerjee and Eckard, 1998, Farrell and Shapiro, 2001), integration cost
(Huck, Konrad, and Müller, 2004), internal capital-allocation (Mialon, 2008), strate-
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models, just by varying the degree of cost efficiencies we can get very diverse
merger implications with respect to outsider profits, consumer surplus and
total welfare. Banerjee and Eckard (1998) and Clougherty and Duso (2009)
present empirical evidence for both a post-merger increase as well as a de-
crease of outsider profits. Mergers might be unprofitable for both insiders
and outsiders. This might happen in declining industries, when preemption
is the motivation for mergers (Fridolfsson and Stennek, 2005). Heubeck,
Smythe, and Zhao (2006, p. 38) demonstrate how a merger can be desirable
for both the competitor and the authority: Suppose the more efficient firm
in a market is an outside firm and the merging firms do not realize any cost
efficiencies. Then average marginal costs in the market might fall because
the less efficient merged firm produces less than before, whereas the more
efficient outsider will produce a larger share of the smaller total output. In
spite of rising prices, total welfare might then rise.
3. Model
In this section, we start with discussing the modeling of merger types. Then
we motivate the use of signaling games before formally introducing them.
3.1. Merger Types
The starting point of our model is the fact that clearing a proposed merger
has implications for the competitor’s profits (Π) and for welfare (W ), as
measured by the welfare standard applied. We shall neglect the impact
on the merging firms’ profits because merging firms will not strategically
gic market power (Huck, Konrad, and Müller, 2001), internal conflict (Banal-Estañol,
Macho-Stadler, and Seldeslachts, 2008), managerial incentives (Faulí-Oller and Motta,
1996, Kräkel and Müller, 2015), managerial synergies (Matsusaka, 1993), entry and exit
(Davidson and Mukherjee, 2007), managerial hubris (Roll, 1986), technology (Lahiri and
Ono, 1988), firm-internal competition (Creane and Davidson, 2004), multi-market pres-
ence (Werden, Joskow, and Johnson, 1991), learning (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001),
union organization (Lommerud, Straume, and Sorgard, 2001) or uncertainty (Amir, Dia-
mantoudi, and Xue, 2009). See Datta, Pinches, and Narayanan (1992) for a meta-
analysis.
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interact with competitors or the authority in our games.2324
We assume that the authorities posit a welfare standard for their merger
decisions and that competitor firms operate as profit-maximizers. For our
analysis, it does not matter whether the authority, say, applies a total or a
consumer welfare standard.
Denote by Π andW the change in the competitor’s profit, resp. welfare, due
to clearing a given merger, while blocking the merger preserves the status
quo which is associated with ‘no change’. Ignoring the possibility that a
merger has no implications whatsoever, the authority’s decision to clear a
merger will either imply a welfare increase (W > 0) or decrease (W < 0),
as compared to the status quo, while the competitor’s profit will either
increase (Π > 0) or decrease (Π < 0). Combining the above, we can assign
each merger to one of four types. Obviously, this covers all conceivable
merger types regardless of their practical relevance.
This case distinction allows us to separate the merger types where the au-
thority’s and the competitor’s interests are aligned (both welfare and profit
change in the same direction, up or down) from those that involve a conflict
of interest, while observing the direction of the individual changes in each
case. In our model, each of the four merger types has a prior probability
derived from the authority’s own collected information on the given notified
merger. The practical relevance of a given merger type is immaterial for our
formal analysis, as we solve our games for all distributions of prior proba-
bilities that the authority might attach to the merger at hand. Moreover,
it is irrelevant what the reasons for the welfare and profit changes are (see
the discussion in the subsection 2.3).
For simplicity, we represent each merger type by a combination of Π,W ∈
{−1, 1}, modeling the direction in which a clearance decision would alter
welfare and the competitor’s profit. This is, naturally, a very simplifying
23We do not include the merging firms as strategic players in the model as we study
the institution of ‘hearing the competitor’ and we assume that insiders, by notifying the
merger, have expressed a clear interest in getting the merger cleared. In this sense, any
signals they might send to the authority will be unequivocally directed towards a clearing
decision.
24Most of the merger literature focusses on the merging firms’ profits and neglects the
competitor. An exception is González (2007) who explicitly deals with merger insiders
and competitors as separate sources of information. Another exception is the taxonomy
of mergers, proposed by Clougherty and Duso (2011, p.314). They distinguish between
four merger types, depending on the merging firms’ as well as the competitors’ post
merger profits.
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assumption. However, it allows us to keep the analysis straightforward and
get clear results while still tackling the relevant strategic issues and preserv-
ing the basic interplay between conflict of interest and interest alignment.
Apart from that, it might already be a challenging task in practice to place
a given merger correctly within our four-type model. From a policy per-
spective, it might also not be practicable to analyze a more general model
where Π and W are distributed on a finer grid, as this would require the
authority to attach probabilities to each of the many types.
3.2. Signaling Game
We set out to capture the characteristic interaction between the competi-
tor(s) and the competition authority, taking into account the information
available to each side and each party’s interests. We want to study the
economic implications of an existing (legal) institution, rather than design
an (optimal) institution.25
Our games start after a merger has been notified.26 Therefore, the profit
and welfare implications of clearing this particular merger are given. The
competitor, as a market insider, is assumed to know the merger type. The
authority does not know the merger type, but it independently gathers
information and tries to predict the consequences of the notified merger
before making a decision.27
We distinguish hard and soft information. Hard information is verifiable in-
formation that the authority gathers, potentially, from all involved parties,
25Lagerlöf and Heidhues (2005) study the interaction between the authority and merger
insiders. They derive optimal merger control institutions in order to induce merger
insiders to invest into the production of hard evidence about efficiency gains. Heller
(2015) studies the effects of asymmetric information between the merging parties and the
authority, taking into account the decision and cost of investigation of a merger proposal.
Milgrom and Roberts (1986) discuss on a general level the problem of a decision maker
who has to rely on the information of (and competition between) better-informed parties.
Any information revealed is assumed to be verifiable.
26This might be any type of merger. The set of notified mergers can be seen as
endogenous to the merger policy, see, e.g., Sørgard (2009) or Nocke and Whinston (2010).
27In practice, also the competitor faces some uncertainty about merger implications.
Therefore, we can understand the payoffs in our games as (discounted) expected values.
See, e.g., Cunha, Sarmento, and Vasconcelos (2014) for an explicit treatment of uncertain
efficiency gains. See Farrell (2012) for an overview of the tools of analysis that are used to
evaluate merger implications. See also Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2010) for a discussion
of the event study methodology, and the recent Miller (2014) on simulations of merger
effects.
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including the competitors. Hard information is provided upon the author-
ity’s request or voluntarily. In the model, hard information is represented
by the distribution of prior probabilities of merger types. Soft information
is non-verifiable information that arises from the communication between
the authority and the competitor.
The focus of our analysis is on communication of soft information. The
question is whether the authority can gain valuable information that is not
verifiable, or if, instead, it can only rely on hard information. As we know
from the signaling literature, if there is no pure conflict of interest, we might
expect transmission of valuable soft information.
We further assume that the competitor, before making its statement, has
an idea of the authority’s prior information, through press releases, com-
munication with the authority and, especially in the EU, the Statement of
Objections. Therefore, we treat the authority’s prior information as common
knowledge.
Combining its prior information with the soft information inferred from
the competitor’s statement, the authority either prohibits (blocks) or clears
the notified merger. For simplicity, we leave out the option of a clearance
decision with remedies.28
We have found cheap talk signaling games to be the most appealing ap-
proach to capture the procedural and informational features of merger re-
view.29 The soft information submitted by the competitor is itself costless
and has no direct consequences. It can only indirectly affect payoffs if it
succeeds in altering the authority’s perception (i.e., beliefs) of the situation
sufficiently to affect the decision. In particular, the competitor can neither
commit to tell the truth nor can lying be detected or has any cost. The
difficulty for the authority in responding to the competitor’s communication
therefore lies in the fact that it is not verifiable. Therefore, the authority
28Vasconcelos (2010) provides a theoretical treatment of remedies in an oligopoly
model. We also leave out potential litigation following a decision. Gürtler and Kräkel
(2009a) analyze litigation incentives depending on the type of takeover. Litigation cost
are a separate source of inefficiencies which are typically neglected in the welfare analysis
of takeovers, see Gürtler and Kräkel (2009b).
29The basic distinction in signaling games is between costly signals that directly affect
payoffs (as, e.g., in the famous job market signaling of Spence, 1973) and signaling where
the signal itself is ‘cheap’, i.e., costless, but might affect beliefs and, therefore, indirectly,
payoffs (e.g., Farrell and Rabin, 1996, Krishna and Morgan, 2008 ). Signaling games
have been successfully applied to many contexts, see, e.g., Riley (2001) and Connelly,
Certo, Ireland, and Reutzel (2011). Crawford (1998) surveys experimental evidence on
the working of cheap talk communication.
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must try to gauge the informational content of the competitor’s statement,
taking into account its own information and the fact that the competitor’s
interest need not, but can, coincide with the authority’s.
We now formally set up a signaling game, i.e., a sequential game with
players S (also referred to as sender or competitor) and R (also referred to
as receiver or authority), and a non-strategic player nature. The timing,
actions and information in this game are as follows:
1. Nature draws the merger type ti ∈ T = {t1, t2, t3, t4} with correspond-
ing prior probabilities pi := Pr{ti} > 0 where ∑ti∈T pi = 1.30
2. S observes ti and chooses a message mj ∈ M = {mA,mB,mC ,mD}.
We refer to S’s actions synonymously as reports or recommendations.
The message set contains as many elements as there are merger types.
Therefore, in principle (though not necessarily in equilibrium), the
merger type can perfectly be communicated.
3. R observes mj but does not observe ti, and chooses a decision dk ∈
D = {dP , dC}, i.e. the decision either prohibits or clears the merger.
4. Payoffs UR(ti, dk) and US(ti, dk) are realized, where
UR(ti, dk) =
Wi if dk = dC0 if dk = dP , US(ti, dk) =
Πi if dk = dC0 if dk = dP ,
ti ∈ T, (W1,W2,W3,W4) = (−1, 1, 1,−1),
(Π1,Π2,Π3,Π4) = (1, 1,−1,−1).
(1)
Hence, there is a conflict of interest for types 1 and 3, whereas for types
2 and 4 both the competitor and the authority prefer the same decision
(clearance for type 2 and blocking for type 4).
In order to simplify the presentation of mixed-strategy equilibria, we exclude
certain non-generic constellations of the four prior probabilities of merger
types. This rules out that indifference between actions is caused by the
configuration of the priors rather than strategic decisions. Moreover, these
assumptions imply a unique default decision (see next subsection).
30We assume strictly positive prior probabilities for each type in order to simplify the
analysis. This is not a restrictive assumption as these probabilities can be arbitrarily
small.
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In words, we assume that no two prior probabilities are equal, nor are there
sums of two (resp. three) prior probabilities that are equal to the sum of the
other two prior probabilities (resp. the remaining prior probability). These
assumptions are not restrictive. Prior probabilities can be arbitrarily close
to the excluded values. Formally,
Assumption 1. For any pair of merger types ti and tj, we assume that
pi 6= pj, pi 6= 1/2 and pi + pj 6= 1/2.
3.3. Default Decision
We define ddefault as the authority’s optimal decision under complete ig-
norance of S’s reports, for a given prior probability distribution of merger
types. Absent any signals by S, it is optimal for R to implement the decision
that implies a higher expected welfare, based on R’s priors. In particular,
the notified merger should be cleared (dC) if the merger is more likely to
be welfare-improving rather than welfare-decreasing, i.e., p2 + p3 > p1 + p4,
and prohibited (dP ) otherwise.
Therefore, the default decision is
ddefault =
dC if p2 + p3 > p1 + p4,dP otherwise. (2)
The corresponding expected welfare (change) is
E[W |ddefault] =

∑
ti∈T piWi if ddefault = dC ,
0 otherwise,
=
−p1 + p2 + p3 − p4 > 0 if p2 + p3 > p1 + p4,0 otherwise.
(3)
4. Pure-Strategy Equilibria
A pure strategy of S is a function m(ti), ti ∈ T , a pure strategy of R is
a function d(mj), mj ∈ M . Conditional on observing message mj ∈ M ,
R’s belief about the merger type is denoted by the probability distribution
µji := Pr{ti|mj} ≥ 0, ti ∈ T . Denote by Tx ⊂ T the set of merger types for
which S sends the message mx ∈ M in any given equilibrium (candidate).
Thus, TA, TB, TC and TD together are a partitioning of the type set.
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Our equilibrium concept is pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium. There-
fore, in addition to the above belief system, we require that R’s decision
dk ∈ D is payoff-maximizing, i.e, the optimal decision d∗(mj) conditional
on observing message mj satisfies
d∗(mj) ∈ arg max
dk∈D
∑
ti∈T
µjiU
R(ti, dk). (4)
Similarly, S’s message mj ∈M must be optimal, given the observed type ti
and R′s optimal choice d∗(mj), i.e., the optimal message m∗(ti) satisfies
m∗(ti) ∈ arg max
mj∈M
US(ti, d∗(mj)). (5)
Finally, for each message mj ∈ M that is played by S on the equilibrium
path, R’s beliefs on the information set corresponding to mj must follow
from Bayes’ rule and S’s strategy. Formally, for each message mj ∈ M for
which there is a type ti ∈ T with m∗(ti) = mj (or, equivalently, Tj 6= ∅),
µji =
pi∑
ts∈Tj ps
. (6)
An equilibrium is denoted by the players’ complete strategies and R’s con-
sistent belief system.{
{m∗(ti) ∀ti ∈ T}, {d∗(mj) ∀mj ∈M}, {µji ∀ti ∈ T,mj ∈M}
}
(7)
We constructively derive all pure-strategy equilibria. Equilibrium candi-
dates can be distinguished by S’s strategy (mi,mj,mk,ml), where the first
entry is the message sent if the merger type is t1, the second for merger type
t2 etc. and mi,mj,mk,ml ∈M .
The analysis of equilibria can be simplified substantially as follows.31 The
informational content of each pure strategy of S corresponds to a parti-
tioning of the type set. For instance, the pure strategy (mA,mB,mA,mA)
partitions the type set into TA ∈ {t1, t3, t4} and TB = {t2}. In words,
the merger type 2 is fully revealed in this candidate whereas the other
three types are bunched together by sending the same message for all of
them. As a consequence, the pure strategy (mA,mB,mA,mA) has the same
31As there are four messages available for each merger type, we have 44 = 256 pure-
strategy equilibrium candidates.
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informational content as (mD,mB,mD,mD) and will implement the same
equilibrium decision.32
By the above, the pure-strategy equilibrium candidates can conveniently be
distinguished by their informational content, i.e., the form of the partition-
ing of the type set T they induce. This results in five classes of equilibrium
candidates which we formally analyze in Lemmas 1 to 5 in the appendix.
Using mw, mx, my, mz ∈ M (resp. ti, tj, tk, tl ∈ T ) to denote arbitrary
and different messages (resp. merger types) these classes of equilibrium
candidates are
(A) Exactly one message is played on the equilibrium path, i.e., S’s strate-
gies have the form Tx = T , Tw = Ty = Tz = ∅. (Lemma 1)
(B) Exactly two messages are played on the equilibrium path, whereby one
of the messages is sent for three types, i.e., S’s strategies are described
by Tx = {ti, tj, tk}, Ty = {tl} and Tw = Tz = ∅. (Lemma 2)
(C) Exactly two messages are played on the equilibrium path, whereby
each message is sent for two types, respectively. These strategies have
the form Tx = {ti, tj}, Ty = {tk, tl} and Tw = Tz = ∅. (Lemma 3)
(D) Exactly three messages are played on the equilibrium path. These
strategies have the form Tx = {ti, tj}, Ty = {tk}, Tz = {tl} and
Tw = ∅. (Lemma 4)
(E) Exactly four messages are played on the equilibrium path. These
strategies have the form Tw = {ti}, Tx = {tj}, Ty = {tk} and Tz =
{tl}. (Lemma 5)
Applying this classification, we describe and explain our findings in the
following, while the Appendix contains the lemmas and proofs. These proofs
constructively derive all equilibria in pure strategies.
(A) There are uninformative equilibria (Lemma 1) in which S always sends
the same message, not revealing any information, and therefore R op-
timally implements the default decision. This equilibrium is supported
by R’s beliefs such that after any (other) message the default is the
32In the signaling literature, this is referred to as inessential multiplicity of signal-
ing languages, see, e.g., Crawford (1998). We distinguish only the essentially different
equilibrium candidates.
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correct decision. Given this, S is indifferent and therefore cannot do
better than always send the same message.
(B) There are equilibria (Lemma 2), in which S reveals one of the types
‘truthfully’ by sending a certain message exclusively for that type. S
sends a second message for all other types, so these types cannot be
distinguished from each other by the message. In these equilibria, the
default decision is implemented.
In principle, the authority has two options. First, R might ignore the
messages and implement the default. This is indeed the best response
and constitutes an equilibrium for certain constellations of R’s prior
information. More precisely, R always implements the welfare-optimal
decision for the single revealed type. Therefore, ignoring S’s message
can only be an equilibrium, if R’s optimal decision is the same for
that single type and for the group of three mergers represented by the
second message. If, however, the optimal decisions corresponding to
the two messages are different, then there is no equilibrium where the
authority ignores S’s message.
Second, the authority might block the merger after one of the messages
and clear it after observing the other message. Then S can manipulate
the decision whenever this increases S’s profit. As three of the types
carry the same message and therefore the same decision, for one of
those three types S must have an incentive to deceive the authority.
This is because, intuitively, for every decision of the authority, there
are exactly two types for which S likes the decision, whereas for the
other two types, S prefers the opposite decision. Thus, no equilibrium
exists in which R’s decision is conditional on S’s message.
(C) There are equilibria (Lemma 3) in which S reveals a pair of types one
of which is the true type. There are two classes of equilibria here.
First, R’s optimal decision might be the same for each pair of types.
This happens if each of the pairs contains a type with positive and
with negative welfare change due to clearance, and within each pair,
the expected welfare change must have the same sign. Given this, S
cannot do better than send messages in this way, and R implements
the default decision.
Second, R’s optimal decisions after each message might be different.
But then, S can pick the preferred decision by sending the appropriate
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message. This is indeed an equilibrium, provided that R’s and S’s
interests are aligned in a certain way: R’s best response must coincide
with S’s preferred decision. We call this the ‘selfish’ equilibrium.
(D) There is no equilibrium in which S sends exactly three messages. The
intuition is as follows. If S sends three messages, then two types are
revealed perfectly. For these two types, R’s best response can either
be the same or different. Suppose it is the same, e.g., dC . Then for
one of those types (e.g. t2 and t3), there is a conflict of interest, so S
deviates to the third message, because there R’s best response must
be the other decision, dP . Now suppose R’s decision is different for
the two revealed types. This only works if S reveals the two types for
which there is no conflict of interest (i.e. t2 and t4; otherwise S or R
have an incentive to deviate). But for the remaining two types (i.e. t1
and t3), R is supposed to implement the same decision (following the
third message), while S prefers different decisions for them, so S can
profitably deviate to another message for one of the remaining types.
(E) The game does not have equilibria in which all four messages are
played. The intuition is simple: If each type is associated with a
unique message, then all types are perfectly revealed and R’s best
response is to implement the first-best decision in each case. But for
two of the types there is a conflict of interest, so S would deviate to
a message that implements the opposite decision.
We discuss these results in section 7.
5. Mixed-Strategy Equilibria
In this section, we discuss the game’s perfect Bayesian equilibria in mixed
strategies. A mixed strategy means any strategy where S randomizes (i.e.
mixes) between at least two messages for at least one type, or a strategy
where R mixes between decisions after at least one message on the equilib-
rium path.
We constructively derive all mixed-strategy equilibria in a series of lemmas
in the appendix. While the model and game remain the same as before, we
introduce new notation for mixed strategies. Denote the probability that S
18
sends message mx for type ti by33
p˜xi = Pr{mx|ti} ∈ [0, 1], ti ∈ T, mx ∈M,
∑
mx∈M
p˜xi = 1. (8)
A complete strategy of S is therefore given by 16 probabilities p˜xi for all
type–message combinations. Similarly, denote the probability that R clears
the merger (dC) after observing message mx by p˜Cx :34
p˜Cx = Pr{dC |mx} ∈ [0, 1], ∀mx ∈M. (9)
As there are only two decisions, a complete strategy of R can be represented
by four clearance probabilities p˜Cx , corresponding to the four messages mx ∈
M . Therefore, a mixed-strategy equilibrium is formally characterized by{
{p˜xi ,∀mx ∈M, ti ∈ T}, {p˜Cx ,∀mx ∈M}, {µxi ,∀ti ∈ T,mx ∈M}
}
. (10)
We partition the mixed-strategy equilibrium candidates as follows.
(I) S plays a pure strategy and R a mixed strategy (Lemma 6).
(II) S plays a mixed strategy and R a pure strategy, always implementing
the same decision regardless of the message (Lemma 7).
(III) S plays a mixed strategy andR a pure strategy, implementing different
decisions depending on the message (Lemma 8).
(IV) Both S and R play a mixed strategy (Lemma 9).
The lemmas and proofs are in the appendix. The proofs constructively de-
rive all mixed-strategy equilibria. Our findings can be described as follows.
(I) There is no mixed-strategy equilibrium in which S plays a pure strat-
egy. This is because given any pure strategy of S, R’s best response is
entirely based on prior probabilities and the corresponding expected
welfare. So R cannot be indifferent, by Assumption 1.
(II) There are mixed-strategy equilibria in which R implements the de-
fault decision independent of the message. This makes S indifferent
between messages, so S is willing to mix (using two, three or four
messages). In turn, as long as S’s mixed strategy is such that the
default decision remains a best response (given updated beliefs), we
have an equilibrium.
33In this notation, the pure strategy m(ti) = mA is now denoted as p˜Ai = 1.
34In this notation, the pure strategy d(mA) = dP is now denoted as p˜CA = 0.
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(III) There are mixed-strategy equilibria in which R implements a message-
dependent decision. The equilibrium decisions are always S’s pre-
ferred decisions because otherwise S would deviate to a message that
implements the preferred decision. As several messages implement the
same decision, S is indifferent between these messages, respectively,
and is therefore willing to mix. In equilibrium, we only require that
R’s best response remains to implement S’s selfish decisions.
(IV) There are no equilibria in which both S and R play a mixed strategy.
The intuition for this result is not obvious.
Based on prior probabilities, R always favors one decision over the
other, say dC because the merger is more likely to be welfare-increasing.
So in order to make R indifferent between decisions after all messages,
S must send each message less often for welfare-increasing types and
each message more often for welfare-decreasing types.35 But this is
impossible, because mixing probabilities for a given type must add
up to one across all messages. The total mixing probability mass
for welfare-increasing types is the same as that for welfare-decreasing
types.
Having established that R will not mix after all messages, R must nec-
essarily play a pure decision after at least one message. But this de-
cision is preferred by S for two types (one of them welfare-increasing,
the other welfare-decreasing), so S will not mix for these types, but
send the message that gives the certain and preferred decision. As
S is supposed to play mixed, this can be done only for the remain-
ing two types. But now the same argument as above applies: For
the remaining types, R favors one decision, by the prior probabil-
ities, and one type must necessarily be welfare-increasing and the
other welfare-decreasing. Again, S cannot make R indifferent after
all messages because the total mixing probability mass is the same for
welfare-increasing and welfare-decreasing types, but in order to make
R indifferent S would need to put more weight in total on one of the
types, which is impossible.
We discuss these results in section 7.
35In order to see this, suppose S sends each of the four messages with equal probability.
Then R does not learn anything and dC remains strictly optimal.
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6. A Two-Message Institution
In the previous sections, we have studied a signaling institution where the
authority’s hearing of the competitor permits four messages, i.e, in principle,
perfect communication of the merger type.
Based on the results we have derived so far, we can study a second insti-
tution, where the authority restricts the message space to two messages
only, M = {mA,mB}. Intuitively, this can be understood as simply asking
for the competitor’s recommendation to either clear or block the merger.
Apart from the message set, the model and game are otherwise unchanged,
as is the default decision. In the following, we explain how our results for
pure- and mixed-strategy equilibria of the four-message game apply to the
two-message game.
6.1. Pure-Strategy Equilibria of the Two-Message Game
Obviously, as there are now two available messages, only cases (A) to (C)
of our case distinction apply. The results of Lemmas 1 to 3 apply directly.
The only changes concern off-equilibrium messages: In Lemma 1, there is
now only one instead of three off-equilibrium messages. In Lemmas 2 and
3, there is no off-equilibrium message, so we do not need supporting beliefs.
Therefore, in the two-message game, we still have either the default decision
in equilibrium, or the ‘selfish’ equilibrium that implements S’s preferred
decision. Existence conditions are unchanged.
6.2. Mixed-Strategy Equilibria of the Two-Message Game
Given that there are only two available messages now, both messages nec-
essarily have to be played on the equilibrium path in any mixed-strategy
equilibrium. In the following we refer to the case distinction (I) - (IV) of
the four-message game.
(I) Lemma 6 shows that there are no mixed-strategy equilibria where S
plays a pure strategy. The proof is based on the fact that R is never
indifferent after S’s pure play. This also applies here.
(II) Lemma 7 shows that there are equilibria that implement the de-
fault decision. The proof explicitly includes the case of two messages
played in equilibrium. We only need to leave out the discussion of
off-equilibrium messages (there are none).
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(III) The proof of Lemma 8 explicitly shows (in case a)) that there is no
equilibrium for the case of two equilibrium messages. The argument
applies directly.
(IV) Lemma 9 shows that there is no equilibrium where both S and R play
a mixed strategy. The case a) of the proof explicitly covers the case
of two messages.
Summarizing, the two-message game has a continuum of mixed-strategy
equilibria, but they always implement the default decision. In particular,
there are no ‘selfish’ equilibria here, similar to those shown for the four-
message game in Lemma 8. These equilibria require the use of four messages
on the equilibrium path.
We discuss these results in the following section.
7. Discussion and Policy Recommendation
Combining the results for the four- and the two-message games, we distin-
guish two classes of equilibria (including pure- and mixed-strategy equilib-
ria): All equilibria implement either the default decision or the competitor’s
preferred decision, with certainty, respectively. There is no equilibrium in
which the authority plays a mixed-strategy. Only the competitor ever mixes
between messages. In any mixed equilibrium, S’s strategies are ‘close to’
the pure strategies of a corresponding pure-strategy equilibrium, such that
R’s pure best response is the same as in the corresponding pure-strategy
equilibrium.
The basic intuition for pure-strategy equilibria is as follows. The author-
ity has two options. First, it might just ignore the competitor’s message.
Then the default decision is taken, and any message by S is a best response.
Second, it might act on the message. This is equivalent to saying that the
authority makes its decision conditional on the message observed. Thus,
it takes a specific decision after observing a certain (subset of the) feasible
message(s), while taking the opposite decision conditional on observing the
remaining message(s). But given this reaction of the authority, the com-
petitor can basically control the authority’s decision by sending (one of)
the message(s) after which the authority implements S’s preferred decision.
Therefore, a message-contingent decision can only occur in equilibrium if the
authority intends to directly implement the competitor’s preferred decision
anyway. We conclude that either the authority must ignore the message, or
it must implement the competitor’s preferred decision in equilibrium.
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The intuition for the selfish mixed-strategy equilibria is similar to that for
the selfish pure-strategy equilibria. The (insubstantial) difference is that
the competitor mixes between pairs of messages, but the messages within a
pair have the same meaning in equilibrium, i.e., two messages recommend
to block the merger, while the other two recommend a clearance decision.
In this sense, two of the messages are redundant. This explains why there
is no selfish mixed-strategy equilibrium in the two-message game: This
equilibrium requires four messages.
All other mixed-strategy equilibria implement the default decision. The
intuition here is that, given that R implements the default, S is indifferent
between messages and there is a range of (pure and mixed) strategies that
leave R’s best response unchanged. The range of mixed strategies is larger
the more certain R’s default decision goes in one or the other direction.
We have shown that the four-message game does not have pure-strategy
equilibria in which more than two messages are played. Moreover, when-
ever more than two messages are used in mixed-strategy equilibria, then
several messages have the same meaning, making the additional messages
inconsequential and redundant. Thus, the competitor strategically conceals
information by choosing a ‘crude’ language.36
Intuitively, using more than two (essentially different) messages reveals too
much information to the authority, from the point of view of the competitor.
Then the conflict of interest becomes payoff-relevant too often. In order to
prevent this, S either does not reveal any information (or only so much
that the default decision remains R’s best response), or if interests are suffi-
ciently aligned, S reveals carefully tailored information to R. In the selfish
equilibrium, the information revealed ensures that S’s preferred decision is
taken, while preventing R from finding out the actual merger type.
In general terms, our results are in line with the theoretical literature on
cheap talk signaling (e.g., Crawford and Sobel (1982)) as follows. Although
we assume that the competitor knows the merger type, there is, given the
authority’s uncertainty, neither a pure conflict of interest, nor are interests
completely opposed. Because of this, we can expect to find equilibria in
which the competitor’s information is partially revealed. However, this only
happens if interests are sufficiently aligned, which is the case whenever the
selfish equilibrium exists. Due to the potential conflict of interest, there
cannot be full information revelation. Similarly, alignment of interest is
36The nature of this result is well-known in the cheap talk literature, see Crawford and
Sobel (1982).
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insufficient for many prior distributions, which results in the default decision
in equilibrium. In some of these equilibria that implement the default, there
is some information transmission. However, the competitor carefully reveals
only so much information that the default decision remains a best response.
In this sense, the information revealed is inconsequential and its revelation
does not hurt the competitor.
In order to prepare a policy recommendation, we establish the payoff supe-
riority of the selfish equilibria.
Proposition 1. Suppose the selfish equilibria exist, i.e., p1 < p2 and p3 <
p4. In these equilibria, the authority’s expected welfare and the competitor’s
expected profit are larger than in any other equilibrium. This applies to the
selfish equilibria in pure strategies of the four- and two-message games as
well as the selfish equilibria in mixed strategies of the four-message game.
By Proposition 1, whenever they exist, the selfish equilibria can be consid-
ered to be the natural solution of the signaling games, as they are strictly
‘preferred’ by both the competitor and the authority.
Whenever a selfish equilibrium does not exist, we have shown that any
equilibrium implements the default decision. Therefore, in these cases, the
authority need not listen to the content of the competitor’s communication
and optimally and straightforwardly implements the default decision, based
on its own prior information.
Let us now look in detail at the implications of the selfish equilibria where
S communicates its preferred decision and R implements it. By Lemmas 3
and 8, the formal condition for this equilibrium is
p1 < p2, p3 < p4. (11)
This constellation of prior information is compatible with dP or dC being
the default decision. It means that if the competitor, through its communi-
cation, reveals that the merger type is profit-increasing (type 1 or 2), then
the authority, based on its own information, must expect that the com-
petitor’s preferred (clearing) decision is more likely to be welfare-increasing
than decreasing. Simultaneously, it must hold that blocking the merger is
optimal by the authority’s prior information should the competitor reveal
that the merger type is profit-decreasing (3 or 4).
Why is the selfish equilibrium welfare-superior to the default decision (Propo-
sition 1)? Clearly, it reveals valuable information to the authority: The
competitor, through the selfish recommendation, truthfully reveals whether
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the actual merger type is profit-increasing (1 or 2) or profit-decreasing (3
or 4), thereby truthfully excluding the two remaining types. Combining
this truthful information with the authority’s own prior information should
intuitively improve the quality of the authority’s decision. The price the au-
thority pays for this information is to implement the competitor’s preferred
decision. Nevertheless, the existence condition of the selfish equilibrium,
(11), ensures that the authority follows the competitor’s recommendation
only if that increases expected welfare as compared to ignoring the com-
petitor. Intuitively, in any equilibrium, the authority plays a best response
based on all available information, and it always has the option to imple-
ment the default. Therefore, a decision different from the default will only
be taken if it is superior.
As mentioned above, the competitor intentionally sends a crude signal by
only revealing a pair of merger types rather than the actual merger type. For
instance, if the competitor reveals that the merger type is profit-increasing
(types 1 or 2), the authority will clear the merger if it thinks, by (11), that
welfare is more likely to increase than decrease given this information. If
the actual merger type is 2, then the authority’s decision will be ex post
welfare-maximizing, whereas, if it is type 1, the decision will be wrong. In
expectation, however, clearance is the right decision. If, instead, the com-
petitor revealed the actual type, then nothing would change if the merger
were 2, but in case of type 1, the authority would block the merger, hurting
the competitor. Given this, it is better for the competitor to conceal the
actual type.
Policy Recommendation. Based on its own (prior and hard) information
about the likely merger implications, the authority should check if con-
dition (11) holds or not. In plain words, this condition is: Conditional
on the merger being profit-increasing for the competitor, welfare must be
expected to increase after clearance, and, conditional on the merger being
profit-decreasing, welfare must be expected to decrease after clearance. If
this condition holds, the authority can ask the competitor directly whether
the merger will increase or decrease the competitor’s profit, while asking
for welfare implications is not sensible by our analysis. Then the author-
ity should implement the competitor’s preferred decision. It can take for
granted that the information is truthful as lying is not in the competitor’s
interest. Equivalently, one might ask for a recommendation to either clear
or block the merger, but should understand that the response will follow
the competitor’s selfish interest. If (11) does not hold, implement the de-
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fault decision, i.e., the optimal decision under ignorance of the competitor’s
communication.
Derived from this recommendation, we emphasize that the quality of the
authority’s own prior gathering of hard information is crucial. This prior
information a) decides whether listening to the competitor’s nonverifiable
communication is the optimal policy, and, b), it is the basis for the default
decision.
Relevance. What is the practical relevance of condition (11) and the self-
ish equilibrium? Consider the requirement p1 < p2, i.e., a given welfare-
increasing merger is more likely to increase rather than decrease the com-
petitor’s profit. This constellation seems very unrealistic if a consumer
welfare standard is applied. Note, however, that this condition is easier
to satisfy under a total welfare standard (see, e.g., Heubeck, Smythe, and
Zhao, 2006, p. 38). Therefore, our results might give a justification for
the consumer welfare standard: under a consumer welfare standard, com-
petitors’ soft information is not worth listening to. This implies that the
authority should only rely on verifiable information. Under a total welfare
standard, however, it is open to argument (from all parties) whether soft
information should be taken into account.37
8. Conclusion
Our paper sets up a formal game-theoretical model for the strategic in-
teractions between competitor and authority in merger proceedings. This
effort follows the spirit of information economics, which understands infor-
mation asymmetries as a major driving force of economic decision making
and should therefore be in the focus of policy making.38
The goal of this paper was to outline the extent of usefulness and abuse
of hearing competitors’ nonverifiable communication in order to derive a
recommendation as to how to distinguish between cases where the authority
can only rely on hard information of competitors, and those where additional
soft information can improve the authority’s decision.
We have analyzed two cheap talk signaling games which differ by the rich-
ness of the signaling language. In equilibrium, the competitor will always
use a ‘crude’ language, strategically concealing information.
37See, e.g., Lyons (2003), Neven and Röller (2005) and Pittman (2007) for other argu-
ments in favor of a consumer welfare standard.
38See, e.g., Stiglitz (2002).
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Our main result is that the authority should generally ignore the competi-
tor’s recommendation, with one exception: If the interests of both parties
are statistically aligned in a certain way, the authority should straightfor-
wardly implement the competitor’s recommendation. We have argued that
the latter situation is unlikely to occur, especially so under a consumer
welfare standard.
The decision of whether to hear or to listen is based entirely on the author-
ity’s own and mostly verifiable information. Moreover, if it is optimal to
ignore the competitor’s subjective communication, the authority’s decision
is, again, based on its own information. Because of this, the competition
authorities should focus on the quality of their own information gathering
effort. This includes hard information obtained from the competitors.
In our analysis we made simplifying assumptions regarding merger types
and the information structure in order to obtain a tractable model. In par-
ticular, competitors in practice are likely to be uncertain about the merger
implications. Apart from that, we think that as long as there is relevant
information on the side of the competitor that is not available to the author-
ities, and is not verifiable, the basic logic of our results applies: In theory,
there are situations in which it is in both sides’ interest to communicate
some of that information and act on it, understanding that this information
will not be complete and it will necessarily have to be profitable for both
sides.
There is a lot of room for future research. Our analysis has neglected
remedies and litigation. Moreover, it would be interesting and relevant to
simultaneously look at the strategic production of soft and hard evidence,
and to include both insiders and outsiders in a simultaneous analysis.
Appendix A. Formal Results
Appendix A.1. Pure-strategy equilibria of the four-message signaling game
We formally derive all pure-strategy equilibria of the four-message signaling
game. As part of these proofs, we will show that R is never indifferent
between decisions on the equilibrium path given that S plays a pure strategy.
This is used in the proof of Lemma 6.
We denote the set of equilibrium messages by M˜ . Thus, an off-equilibrium
message my is denoted by my /∈ M˜ . Arbitrary (and different) types are
denoted by ti, tj, tk, tl ∈ T , and arbitrary (and different) messages by mw,
mx, my, mz ∈M .
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Lemma 1. The game has “uninformative” pure-strategy equilibria in which
S always sends the same message mx ∈M , while R implements the default
decision. Formally, for all ti ∈ T and all my /∈ M˜ , these equilibria are
1. (implementing ddefault = dC)
m∗(ti) = mx, d∗(mx) = d∗(my) = ddefault = dC ,
µxi = pi, µ
y
2 + µy3 ≥ µy1 + µy4.
(A.1)
existence condition: p2 + p3 > p1 + p4.
2. (implementing ddefault = dP )
m∗(ti) = mx, d∗(mx) = d∗(my) = ddefault = dP ,
µxi = pi, µ
y
2 + µy3 ≤ µy1 + µy4.
(A.2)
existence condition: p2 + p3 < p1 + p4.
Proof of Lemma 1. Clearly, as S always sends the same message mx (for
every type), R’s updated beliefs on the equilibrium path are equal to the
prior beliefs. This implies that the default decision is implemented. The
default decision is based on expected welfare only. Thus, it might be dP or
dC . Depending on the type, S’s preferred choice might coincide with the
default or not. If not, then S would have an incentive to deviate if there
is an off-equilibrium message my /∈ M˜ for which R does not implement the
default decision. Therefore, R’s off-equilibrium beliefs must be such that R
implements the default whenever an off-equilibrium messagemy is observed.
More precisely:
1. For types ti ∈ {t1, t2}, S prefers dC . If ddefault = dC , there is no incen-
tive to deviate. If, however, ddefault = dP , then S has an incentive to
deviate to an off-equilibrium message my if that leads to dC . There-
fore, if p2 + p3 < p1 + p4 (when ddefault = dP ), then the supporting
beliefs must satisfy∑
ti∈T
µyiWi ≤ 0 ⇔ µy2 + µy3 ≤ µy1 + µy4. (A.3)
It can be seen that this corresponds to the relation of priors that
implements ddefault = dP .
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2. For types ti ∈ {t3, t4}, S prefers dP . If ddefault = dP , there is no
incentive to deviate. If, however, ddefault = dC , then S has an incen-
tive to deviate to an off-equilibrium message my if that leads to dP .
By symmetry, we obtain results similar to the above, with reversed
inequalities.
Note that, by Assumption 1, R is never indifferent between decisions, as
the equilibrium (default) decision is exclusively based on expected welfare
and prior probabilities.
Lemma 2. The game has pure-strategy equilibria in which S plays two
messages in equilibrium, M˜ = {mx,my}, such that one type is revealed
through message my, i.e., Ty = {tl}, while the other message mx is sent for
the remaining types, ts ∈ Tx = {ti, tj, tk}. In these equilibria, R ignores S’s
message and implements the default decision. These equilibria are (denoting
off-equilibrium messages by mz /∈ M˜)
1. (implementing ddefault = dP )
m∗(ts) = mx, m∗(tl) = my, tl ∈ {t1, t4},
d∗(mx) = d∗(my) = d∗(mz) = ddefault = dP ,
µxs =
ps∑
tr∈Tx pr
, µxl = 0, µys = 0, µ
y
l = 1,
µz2 + µz3 ≤ µz1 + µz4,
(A.4)
existence condition: ∑ts∈Tx psWs ≤ 0, Wl < 0.
2. (implementing ddefault = dC)
m∗(ts) = mx, m∗(tl) = my, tl ∈ {t2, t3},
d∗(mx) = d∗(my) = d∗(mz) = ddefault = dC ,
µxs =
ps∑
tr∈Tx pr
, µxl = 0, µys = 0, µ
y
l = 1,
µz2 + µz3 ≥ µz1 + µz4,
(A.5)
existence condition: ∑ts∈Tx psWs ≥ 0, Wl > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider S’s candidate strategy which is represented
by Tx = {ti, tj, tk} and Ty = {tl}. Two messages are therefore played on the
equilibrium path. As message my is sent for type tl only, we have µyl = 1
and µxl = 0, and R’s best response is
d∗(my) =
dP if Wl < 0, i.e., tl ∈ {t1, t4},dC if Wl > 0, i.e., tl ∈ {t2, t3}. (A.6)
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Message mx is sent for all other types, which gives the updated beliefs
stated in (A.4) and (A.5). R’s best response is found as follows. Decision
dP implies UR = 0 whereas dC has an expected payoff of∑
ts∈Tx
µxsU
R(ts, dC) =
∑
ts∈Tx
ps∑
tr∈Tx pr
Ws. (A.7)
Therefore, dC is optimal if∑
ts∈Tx
ps∑
tr∈Tx pr
Ws ≥ 0 ⇔
∑
ts∈Tx
psWs ≥ 0. (A.8)
It follows that
d∗(mx) =
dP if
∑
ts∈Tx psWs ≤ 0,
dC if
∑
ts∈Tx psWs ≥ 0.
(A.9)
Combining (A.6) and (A.9), we distinguish four cases:
1. ∑ts∈Tx psWs ≤ 0 and Wl < 0:
These conditions imply ∑ti∈T piWi < 0, i.e., ddefault = dP . Here,
the optimal decision after each message is d∗(my) = d∗(mx) = dP =
ddefault. Deviating to the other message (mx, resp. my) does not
affect the decision and is thus never profitable. We need supporting
beliefs such that after observing an off-equilibrium message mz, R
implements the same decision, i.e., we need µz2 + µz3 ≤ µz1 + µz4 which
implies d∗(mz) = dP .
2. ∑ts∈Tx psWs ≤ 0 and Wl > 0:
Here, d∗(my) = dC and d∗(mx) = dP . S sends mx for three types and
has a payoff of 0 in these cases. There is no equilibrium here, because
for one of those three types, S’s payoff can be improved from 0 to 1
by reporting my instead, which leads to decision dC .
3. ∑ts∈Tx psWs ≥ 0 and Wl < 0:
Here, d∗(my) = dP and d∗(mx) = dC . S sends mx for three types and
must have a negative payoff for at least one of those types. There is no
equilibrium here, because S can avoid a negative payoff by reporting
my instead, which leads to decision dP with a payoff of 0.
4. ∑ts∈Tx psWs ≥ 0 and Wl > 0:
These conditions imply ∑ti∈T p(ti)Wi ≥ 0, i.e., ddefault = dC . Here,
d∗(my) = d∗(mx) = dC = ddefault. Deviating to the other message (mx,
resp. my) does not affect the decision and is thus not profitable. We
need supporting beliefs such that after observing an off-equilibrium
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messagemz, R implements the same decision. Thus, we need µz2+µz3 ≥
µz1 + µz4 which implies d∗(mz) = dC .
Note that in the above four cases, ∑ts∈Tx psWs ≥ 0 (resp. ≤ 0) can never
hold with equality, by Assumption 1. Therefore, R is never indifferent
between decisions after message mx (and, obviously, neither after message
my).
Lemma 3. The game has pure-strategy equilibria in which pairs of types are
associated with the same message, Tx = {ti, tj} and Ty = {tk, tl}, while R
either implements the default decision or S’s preferred decision. Denoting
ts ∈ Tx, tu ∈ Ty and mz /∈ M˜ , the set of these equilibria can be partitioned
as follows.
1. (implementing ddefault = dP )
m∗(ts) = mx, m∗(tu) = my,
d∗(mx) = d∗(my) = d∗(mz) = ddefault = dP ,
µxs =
ps
pi + pj
, µys = 0, µyu =
pu
pk + pl
, µxu = 0,
µz2 + µz3 < µz1 + µz4.
(A.10)
existence condition:
(∑
ts∈Tx psWs ≤ 0,
∑
tu∈Ty puWu ≤ 0
)
.
2. (implementing ddefault = dC)
m∗(ts) = mx, m∗(tu) = my,
d∗(mx) = d∗(my) = d∗(mz) = ddefault = dC ,
µxs =
ps
pi + pj
, µys = 0, µyu =
pu
pk + pl
, µxu = 0,
µz2 + µz3 ≥ µz1 + µz4.
(A.11)
existence condition:
(∑
ts∈Tx psWs ≥ 0,
∑
tu∈Ty puWu ≥ 0
)
.
3. (implementing S’s preferred decision)
Tx = {t1, t2}, Ty = {t3, t4},
m∗(ts) = mx, m∗(tu) = my,
d∗(mx) = dC , d∗(my) = dP , d∗(mz) ∈ {dP , dC},
µxs =
ps
p1 + p2
, µys = 0, µyu =
pu
p3 + p4
, µxu = 0,
µzi ≥ 0.
(A.12)
existence condition: p3 < p4, p1 < p2.
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Proof of Lemma 3. We consider all candidates where Tx = {ti, tj} and
Ty = {tk, tl}, i.e. the messages mx and my are played on the equilibrium
path, each message for exactly two types. The corresponding updated be-
liefs conditional on message mx, resp. my, therefore have the form stated
in Lemma 3. Consider R’s decision conditional on observing message mx.
Decision dP implies UR = 0, whereas dC has an expected payoff of∑
ts∈Tx
µxsU
R(ts, dC) =
∑
ts∈Tx
ps∑
tr∈Tx pr
Ws. (A.13)
Therefore, dC is optimal if∑
ts∈Tx
ps∑
tr∈Tx pr
Ws ≥ 0 ⇔
∑
ts∈Tx
psWs ≥ 0. (A.14)
Summarizing, the optimal decision is
d∗(mx) =
dP if
∑
ts∈Tx psWs ≤ 0,
dC if
∑
ts∈Tx psWs ≥ 0.
(A.15)
By symmetry, the optimal decision conditional on observing message my 6=
mx is
d∗(my) =
dP if
∑
tu∈Ty puWu ≤ 0,
dC if
∑
tu∈Ty puWu ≥ 0.
(A.16)
Combining (A.15) and (A.16), we distinguish four cases:
1. ∑ts∈Tx psWs ≤ 0 and ∑tu∈Ty puWu ≤ 0:
This constellation implies ∑ti∈T p(ti)Wi ≤ 0 and, therefore, ddefault =
dP . Here, d∗(my) = d∗(mx) = dP = ddefault. S has no incentive to
deviate between messagesmx andmy as both imply the same decision.
We need supporting beliefs such that after off-equilibrium messages
mz, R implements dP as well: µz2 + µz3 ≤ µz1 + µz4.
2. ∑ts∈Tx psWs ≥ 0 and ∑tu∈Ty puWu ≥ 0:
This implies ∑ti∈T piWi ≥ 0 and, therefore, ddefault = dC . Here,
d∗(my) = d∗(mx) = dC = ddefault. S has no incentive to deviate
between messages mx and my as both imply the same decision. We
need supporting beliefs such that after off-equilibrium messages mz,
R implements dC as well: µz2 + µz3 ≥ µz1 + µz4.
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3. ∑ts∈Tx psWs ≤ 0 and ∑tu∈Ty puWu ≥ 0:
Here, d∗(mx) = dP and d∗(my) = dC . Therefore, S is able to ‘choose’
R’s decision in its favor by sending the appropriate message. This
implies that there is no equilibrium here unless R’s decisions co-
incide with S’s preferred decisions for every type. This is equiva-
lent to requiring that Tx = {t3, t4} (i.e. blocking of types 3 and
4) and Ty = {t1, t2} (i.e. clearing of types 1 and 2). Given that
Tx = {t3, t4} and Ty = {t1, t2}, the condition (∑ts∈Tx psWs ≤ 0 and∑
tu∈Ty puWu ≥ 0) simplifies to
p3W3 + p4W4 ≤ 0 and p1W1 + p2W2 ≥ 0
⇔ p3 < p4 and p1 < p2.
(A.17)
4. ∑ts∈Tx psWs ≥ 0 and ∑tu∈Ty puWu ≤ 0:
As mx and my are arbitrary (but different and feasible) messages, the
analysis of this case is already covered by case 3. above.
Note that the expected-welfare conditions in (A.15) and (A.16) cannot hold
with equality, by Assumption 1. Therefore, R is never indifferent between
decisions.
Lemma 4. The game does not have a pure-strategy equilibrium where ex-
actly three different messages are used on the equilibrium path.
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose that exactly three different messages are
played in equilibrium, Tx = {ti, tj}, Ty = {tk}, Tz = {tl}. This implies
that S sends a unique message for two of the four types (tk and tl) respec-
tively, so these two types are identified. For these two types, R optimally
responds by implementing the first-best decision. We distinguish two cases.
a) Suppose for the two identified types, i.e., after messages my and mz,
R’s first-best decision is the same. Therefore, one of the two types
involves a conflict of interest, and, moreover, R optimally implements
the opposite decision after message mx. Therefore, S has an incentive
to deviate from either my or mz and can improve profit by sending
mx instead.
b) Suppose for the two identified types the first-best decision is different.
In this case, S can ‘control’ R’s decision by sending the appropriate
message, eithermy ormz. Therefore, in an equilibrium the two identi-
fied types must be t2 and t4 which do not involve a conflict of interest.
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However, for the two remaining types t1 and t3 and message mx, R’s
decision must be the same, but S prefers different decisions for each
of them, and can get the preferred decision by deviating to either my
or mz.
Note that in each situation above, R’s best response is entirely based on
prior probabilities and the corresponding expected welfare, so R is never
indifferent between decisions, by Assumption 1.
Lemma 5. The game does not have a pure-strategy equilibrium where four
different messages are used on the equilibrium path.
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose S sends a different message for each type,
thereby fully revealing all types. Then R’s best response is to implement
the first-best decision for each type (dc for t2 and t3, dp for t1 and t4).
However, for types t1 and t3, there is a conflict of interest. Therefore, S has
an incentive to deviate to a message that implements S ′s preferred decision.
This profitable deviation is always feasible. Note that after each message
in this candidate, R’s best response is unique.
Appendix A.2. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1. The existence condition for the selfish pure- and
mixed-strategy equilibria of the four-message game (Lemmas 3 and 8) and,
by the discussion in subsection 6, the selfish pure-strategy equilibria of the
two-message game, was shown to be
p3 < p4, p1 < p2. (A.18)
By Lemmas 1 to 9, and the discussion in subsection 6, all pure- and mixed-
strategy equilibria of the four- and two-message games implement either S’s
preferred (selfish) decision or the default decision. Therefore, it suffices to
show that the selfish equilibria are payoff-superior for both players to the
corresponding default decision.
Given the above existence condition for the selfish equilibrium and the fact
that there always exists an equilibrium that implements the default decision
(see, e.g., the uninformative equilibrium described in Lemma 1), the two can
only be compared in case both exist simultaneously, i.e., whenever (A.18)
holds. We assume this in the following.
We start with considering the authority’s payoff, UR. First, suppose dP is
the default decision (and (A.18) holds). Then taking the default implies
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UR = 0. The selfish equilibrium implements dP as well if the merger type
is either type 3 or type 4, with UR = 0. If, however, the merger is of
type 1, we get UR = −1 and for type 2 we get UR = 1 where, by (A.18),
the latter is more likely. In expectation the selfish equilibrium implements
E[UR] = p1W1+p2W2 = −p1+p2 > 0 (the latter by (A.18)) which is better
than the default UR = 0.
Second, suppose dC is the default decision (and (A.18) holds). Taking
the default implies E[UR] = ∑ti∈T piWi = −p1 + p2 + p3 − p4 > 0 (the
latter because dC is the default). The selfish equilibrium implements dP
for types 3 and 4, with UR = 0, and it implements dC for types 1 (with
UR = −1) and 2 (with UR = 1), where, again, welfare is conditionally more
likely to be positive. In expectation, the selfish equilibrium implements
E[UR] = p1W1 + p2W2 = −p1 + p2 > −p1 + p2 + p3 − p4, because p3 < p4
by (A.18).
Combining these results, we conclude that the selfish equilibrium imple-
ments strictly higher expected welfare (UR) than the default, regardless of
what the default decision is.
Finally, consider the competitor’s payoff, US. As the selfish equilibrium al-
ways implements S’s preferred decision, whereas the default decision max-
imizes expected welfare, the selfish equilibrium is intuitively superior. We
show this formally in the following.
Suppose dP is the default decision. Then US = 0 ex post, whereas the
selfish equilibrium has US = 1 for types 1 and 2 and US = 0 for types 3
and 4. In expectation, the selfish equilibrium gives E[US] = p1 + p2 > 0,
which is strictly better. Now suppose dC is the default decision. Then
E[US] = p1 + p2 − p3 − p4, whereas the selfish equilibrium, again, has
US = 1 for types 1 and 2 and US = 0 for types 3 and 4. In expectation,
the selfish equilibrium gives E[US] = p1 + p2 > 0, which obviously strictly
better than p1 + p2 − p3 − p4.
Appendix A.3. Mixed-strategy equilibria of the four-message signaling game
In the proofs below we use mw, mx, my, mz ∈ M (resp. ti, tj, tk, tl ∈ T ) to
denote arbitrary and different messages (resp. merger types). Moreover, M˜
denotes the set of messages that are played on the equilibrium path. Thus,
m /∈ M˜ denotes off-equilibrium messages. In order to simplify the formal
statements of equilibria, we make the following omissions in the lemmas
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below. We omit the statements of pmi = 0 for off-equilibrium messages
m /∈ M˜ , i.e., we state S’s mixing probabilities only for the equilibrium
messages. Furthermore, we simplify the statement of R’s off-equilibrium
decisions and off-equilibrium beliefs in equilibria where these beliefs are
unrestricted because there is no potential deviation incentive for S. In
these cases we write pCw ∈ [0, 1] and µwi ∈ [0, 1] without stating the precise
relationship between beliefs and corresponding decisions:
µwi ∈ [0, 1],
∑
ti∈T
µwi = 1, ∀ti ∈ T, ∀mw /∈ M˜, (A.19)
pCw =
1 if
∑
ti∈T µ
w
i Wi ≥ 0
0 if ∑ti∈T µwi Wi ≤ 0, ∀mw /∈ M˜. (A.20)
Lemma 6. The game does not have mixed-strategy equilibria in which S
plays a pure strategy.
Proof of Lemma 6. By Assumption 1 and as analyzed in the proofs of
Lemmas 1 to 5, R has a unique and pure-strategy best response to any pure
strategy of S.
Lemma 7. The game has mixed-strategy equilibria in which R plays a pure
strategy. In these equilibria, R implements the default decision (d = ddefault)
regardless of the message(s). S plays a mixed strategy and plays either
two, three or four messages on the equilibrium path (|M˜ | ∈ {2, 3, 4}). The
equilibria can be partitioned into
1. (implementing ddefault = dC)
pk2p2 + pk3p3 ≥ pk1p1 + pk4p4, ∀mk ∈ M˜, pCx = 1, ∀mx ∈M,
µki =
pki pi∑
ts∈T p
k
sps
, ∀ti ∈ T,∀mk ∈ M˜,
µr2 + µr3 ≥ µr1 + µr4 ∀mr /∈ M˜.
(A.21)
existence condition: ddefault = dC.
2. (implementing ddefault = dP )
pk2p2 + pk3p3 ≤ pk1p1 + pk4p4, ∀mk ∈ M˜, pCx = 0, ∀mx ∈M,
µki =
pki pi∑
ts∈T p
k
sps
, ∀ti ∈ T,∀mk ∈ M˜,
µr2 + µr3 ≤ µr1 + µr4 ∀mr /∈ M˜.
(A.22)
existence condition: ddefault = dP .
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Proof of Lemma 7. Given thatR always implements the same decision, S
is always indifferent between messages, and therefore willing to play mixed.
This requires, of course, that R implements that decision also off the equilib-
rium path. For an equilibrium, we need that R’s decision is a best response
to S’s strategy. After each message mk ∈ M˜ (i.e., on the equilibrium path),
R’s best response is dC if
∑
ti∈T
µkiWi ≥ 0 ⇔
∑
ti∈T
pki pi∑
ts∈T p
k
sps
Wi ≥ 0 ⇔
∑
ti∈T
pki piWi ≥ 0
⇔ pk2p2 + pk3p3 ≥ pk1p1 + pk4p4.
(A.23)
For all off-equilibrium messages mr /∈ M˜ (if there are any), we need beliefs
that lead to the same optimal decision,
µr2 + µr3 ≥ µr1 + µr4, ∀mr /∈ M˜. (A.24)
If the reverse inequalities hold in the above, then dP is the best response on
and off the equilibrium path.
Finally, note that if we add up the conditions (A.23) over all messages,
making use of the identity ∑m∈M˜ pmi ≡ 1, then we get p2 +p3 > p1 +p4, i.e.,
the condition that makes dC the default decision. Thus, the above described
equilibrium implies the default decision (again, with ddefault = dP for the
reverse inequalities.
Lemma 8. The game has mixed-strategy equilibria in which R plays a pure
strategy including both decisions on the equilibrium path. In these equilibria,
R implements S’s preferred decision, and they exist only if p2 > p1 and
p3 < p4. They can be partitioned by the number of messages |M˜ | played by
S on the equilibrium path:
1. (S plays messages M˜ = {mx,my,mz} in equilibrium)
1.1 (Implementing dC after mx and my, and dP after mz.)
For mk ∈ {mx,my}, ti ∈ {t1, t2}, tj ∈ {t3, t4}:
pk2p2 ≥ pk1p1, pk3 = pk4 = 0, pCk = 1,
pz1 = pz2 = 0, pz3 = pz4 = 1, pCz = 0,
µki =
pki pi
pk1p1 + pk2p2
, µkj = 0, µzi = 0, µzj =
pj
p3 + p4
,
pCw ∈ [0, 1], µwl ∈ [0, 1], ∀tl ∈ T, mw /∈ M˜.
(A.25)
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1.2 (Implementing dP after mx and my, and dC after mz.)
For mk ∈ {mx,my}, ti ∈ {t3, t4}, tj ∈ {t1, t2}:
pk3p3 ≤ pk4p4, pk1 = pk2 = 0, pCk = 0,
pz3 = pz4 = 0, pz1 = pz2 = 1, pCz = 1,
µki =
pki pi
pk3p3 + pk4p4
, µkj = 0, µzi = 0, µzj =
pj
p1 + p2
,
pCw ∈ [0, 1], µwl ∈ [0, 1], tl ∈ T, mw /∈ M˜.
(A.26)
2. (S plays all four messages in equilibrium, R plays S ′s preferred deci-
sion after two messages respectively.)
For mk ∈ {mx,my}, ml ∈ {mw,mz}, ti ∈ {t1, t2}, tj ∈ {t3, t4}:
pk2p2 ≥ pk1p1, pk3 = pk4 = 0, pCk = 1,
pl3p3 ≤ pl4p4, pl1 = pl2 = 0, pCl = 0,
µki =
pki pi
pk1p1 + pk2p2
, µkj = 0, µli = 0, µlj =
pljpj
pl3p3 + pl4p4
.
(A.27)
3. (S plays all four messages in equilibrium, R plays one of the decisions
after three messages, the other decision after the remaining message.)
3.1 (Implementing dC after mx, my, mz and dP after mw.)
For mk ∈ {mx,my,mz}, ti ∈ {t1, t2}, tj ∈ {t3, t4}:
pk2p2 ≥ pk1p1, pk3 = pk4 = 0, pCk = 1,
pw1 = pw2 = 0, pw3 = pw4 = 1, pCw = 0,
µki =
pki pi
pk1p1 + pk2p2
, µkj = 0, µwi = 0, µwj =
pj
p3 + p4
.
(A.28)
3.2 (Implementing dP after mx, my, mz and dC after mw.)
For mk ∈ {mx,my,mz}, ti ∈ {t3, t4}, tj ∈ {t1, t2}:
pk3p3 ≤ pk4p4, pk1 = pk2 = 0, pCk = 0,
pw3 = pw3 = 0, pw1 = pw2 = 1, pCw = 1,
µki =
pki pi
pk3p3 + pk4p4
, µkj = 0, µwi = 0, µwj =
pj
p1 + p2
.
(A.29)
Proof of Lemma 8. We cover all equilibrium candidates where S mixes,
while R plays a pure strategy but does not always play the same decision.39
These candidates are
39The candidates where R always plays the same decision are covered in Lemma 7.
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(a) |M˜ | = 2, R plays dC after message mx and dP after message my,
(b.1) |M˜ | = 3, R plays dC after mx, my and dP after mz,
(b.2) |M˜ | = 3, R plays dP after mx, my and dC after mz,
(c) |M˜ | = 4, R plays dC after mx, my and dP after mw, mz,
(d.1) |M˜ | = 4, R plays dC after mx, my, mz and dP after mw,
(d.2) |M˜ | = 4, R plays dP after mx, my, mz and dC after mw.
In the following, we analyze these candidates.
(a) |M˜ | = 2, R plays dC after message mx and dP after message my 6= mx.
The unique best response of S is obviously mx for t1 and t2 and my
for t3 and t4. This is a pure strategy. Therefore, there are no (mixed)
equilibria for a).
(b.1) |M˜ | = 3, R plays dC after mx, my and dP after mz. Consider S’s best
response. Message mz is the unique (and pure) best response for t3
and t4. Optimality of dP requires the existence condition p3 < p4. For
t1 and t2, S is indifferent between messages mx and my (but would
never play mz) and therefore is prepared to mix. However, in order
to correspond to R’s strategies, S mixed strategies must make dC the
optimal decision, i.e.,
µk1W1 + µk2W2 ≥ 0 ⇔
pk1p1
pk1p1 + pk2p2
W1 +
pk2p2
pk1p1 + pk2p2
W2 ≥ 0
⇔ pk2p2 ≥ pk1p1, mk ∈ {mx,my}
(A.30)
Adding the two conditions in (A.30), using pxi + p
y
i ≡ 1 for i ∈ {1, 2},
we get the existence condition p2 ≥ p1 which, by Assumption 1 im-
plies p2 > p1. In this equilibrium, S’s preferred decision is always
implemented. Therefore, S cannot have an incentive to deviate to the
off-equilibrium message, implying unrestricted off-equilibrium beliefs.
(b.2) |M˜ | = 3, R plays dP after mx, my and dC after mz. The proof is
omitted because, by symmetry, it is similar to the analysis of (b.1).
The types who send mz resp. mx and my are interchanged and we
have reversed inequalities for the optimality of dP after mx and my.
The existence conditions are the same.
(c) |M˜ | = 4, R plays dC after mx, my and dP after mw, mz. Consider S’s
best response. Messages mx and my (resp. mw and mz) will only be
sent for t1 and t2 (resp. t3 and t4). However, S is indifferent between
mx and my (resp. mw and mz), so is prepared to mix in any way.
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For an equilibrium, we therefore only require that the above stated
decisions are optimal given S’s mixed strategies. Therefore, we need
(derived similar to (A.30))
pk2p2 ≥ pk1p1, pl3p3 ≤ pl4p4, ∀mk ∈ {mx,my}, ml ∈ {mw,mz}.
(A.31)
Adding up the two conditions for each message pair (using px2 +p
y
2 ≡ 1
etc.), we get the existence conditions p2 > p1 and p3 < p4 (strict
inequalities by Assumption 1).
(d.1) |M˜ | = 4, R plays dC after mx, my, mz and dP after mw. Consider S’s
best response. Message mw is the unique (and pure) best response
for t3 and t4. Then optimality of dP requires the existence condition
p4 > p3.
As for types t1 and t2, S is indifferent between the remaining three
messages but would never sendmw. Therefore S is willing to mix these
messages in any way. However, we need dC to be optimal, which is
equivalent to (derived similar to (A.30))
pk2p2 ≥ pk1p1, mk ∈ {mx,my,mz}. (A.32)
Adding up these three conditions (using px2 + p
y
2 + pz2 ≡ 1 etc.), we get
the existence condition p2 > p1 (strict inequality by Assumption 1).
(d.2) |M˜ | = 4, R plays dP after mx, my, mz and dC after mw. The proof is
omitted because of similarity to that of (d.1), by symmetry.
Lemma 9. The game does not have equilibria where both S and R play
mixed strategies.
Proof of Lemma 9. Before classifying equilibrium candidates, we estab-
lish the result that R will never mix between decisions after all messages,
i.e., R will play pure after at least one of the messages on the equilib-
rium path. Mixing after all messages requires indifference for each message
mw ∈ M˜ on the equilibrium path, i.e.∑
ti∈T
µwi Wi = 0 ⇔
∑
ti∈T
pwi pi∑
ts∈T p
w
s ps
Wi = 0
⇔ ∑
ti∈T
pwi piWi = 0 ⇔ pw2 p2 + pw3 p3 = pw1 p1 + pw4 p4.
(A.33)
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Now add up these equalities over all messages, making use of the identity∑
mw∈M˜ p
w
i ≡ 1 for all ti ∈ T . This results in p2+p3 = p1+p4 which is ruled
out by Assumption 1. Therefore, R cannot be indifferent after all messages,
so we ignore the respective equilibrium candidates in the following. In order
to play a mixed strategy, S must play at least two messages in equilibrium.
The remaining candidates can be partitioned into the following cases (by
the set M˜ of messages played in equilibrium):
a) M˜ = {mx,my}. R mixes after mx and plays pure after my.
b) M˜ = {mx,my,mz}. R mixes after mx and plays pure after my, mz.
c) M˜ = {mx,my,mz}. R mixes after mx, my and plays pure after mz.
d) M˜ = M . R mixes after mw and plays pure after mx, my, mz.
e) M˜ = M . R mixes after mw, mx and plays pure after my, mz.
f) M˜ = M . R mixes after mw, mx, my and plays pure after mz.
In the following, we analyze these cases one by one.
a) M˜ = {mx,my}. R mixes aftermx and plays pure aftermy. Suppose R
plays dC after my (pure). Then for t1 and t2, S’s unique best response
is to send my. Similarly, for t3 and t4, S’s unique best response is
to send mx, regardless of R’s mixing probabilities. But this is a pure
strategy, contradicting the assumption of a mixed strategy of S. By
symmetry, a similar argument applies if R plays dP after my.
b) M˜ = {mx,my,mz}. R mixes after mx and plays pure after my, mz.
b.1) Suppose R plays decision dC after my and mz. Then for types
t3 and t4 the unique best response is to send mx in order to get
dP at least sometimes, while S will never play mx for t1 and t2.
Given this, mixing over decisions after mx is optimal only if R is
indifferent,
µx3W3 + µx4W4 = 0 ⇔
p3
p3 + p4
W3 +
p4
p3 + p4
W4 = 0 ⇔ p3 = p4,
(A.34)
which is ruled out by Assumption 1.
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b.2) Suppose R plays decision dP after my and mz. By symmetry, the
conclusion is similar to that for b.1).
b.3) Suppose R plays decision dC after my and dP after mz. Then S’s
unique best response is for each type to always send either my or
mz. This implements S’s preferred decision, so S will never play
mx (after which R plays mixed), contradicting the candidate.
c) M˜ = {mx,my,mz}. R mixes after mx, my and plays pure after mz.
Suppose R plays dC aftermz. Then for types t1 and t2, S’s unique best
response is to send mz (pure play). Message mz will never be sent for
t3 and t4 because S’s preferred decision dP is only played after mx and
my (as part of the mixing). As mx and my are only sent for t3 and t4
(according to some px3 , p
y
3, px4 , p
y
4, possibly including pure components),
R’s indifference condition (to make mixing optimal) is again p3 = p4
(derived similarly to (A.34)), which is ruled out by Assumption 1.
Therefore, R will not mix for both my and mx, contradicting the
candidate. By symmetry, the same conclusion obtains if we assume
that R plays dP after mz.
d) M˜ = M . R mixes after mw and plays pure after mx, my, mz.
d.1) Suppose R always plays the same decision, say dC , after mx, my,
mz. Then S will send these messages exclusively for t1 and t2,
while mw is sent exclusively for t3 and t4. But then, similar to
the derivation of (A.34), R must be indifferent between decisions,
knowing that the type is either t3 or t4. Indifference requires
p3 = p4 which is ruled out by Assumption 1. By symmetry, we
get the same conclusion if we assume that dP is played after mx,
my, mz.
d.2) Suppose R plays different ‘pure’ decisions, i.e., dC after one or
two of mx, my, mz, and dP after the remaining message(s). Then
S’s best response is obviously a pure strategy, avoiding R’s mixed
play and therefore contradicting the candidate.
e) M˜ = M . R mixes after mw, mx and plays pure after my, mz.
e.1) Suppose R always plays the same decision, say dC , after my and
mz. Then S will send these messages exclusively for t1 and t2 (in
some possibly mixed way), while mw, mx are sent exclusively for
t3 and t4. But then, similar to the derivation of (A.34), R must
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be indifferent between decisions after both mw and mx, knowing
that the type is either t3 or t4. Indifference requires p3 = p4
which is ruled out by Assumption 1. By symmetry, we get the
same conclusion if we assume that dP is played after my and mz.
e.2) Suppose R plays different decisions after my and mz. Then S’s
best response is obviously a pure strategy, avoiding R’s mixed
play and therefore contradicting the candidate.
f) M˜ = M . R mixes after mw, mx, my and plays pure after mz. Suppose
R plays dC aftermz. Then for types t1 and t2, S’s unique best response
is to send mz (pure play). Message mz will never be sent for t3 and t4
because S’s preferred decision dP is only played after mw, mx and my
(as part of the mixing). As mw, mx and my are only sent for t3 and t4
(according to some pure/mixed play), R’s indifference condition (to
make mixing optimal) is again p3 = p4 (derived similarly to (A.34)),
which is ruled out by Assumption 1. Therefore, R will not mix for all
three messages, contradicting the candidate. By symmetry, the same
conclusion obtains if we assume that R plays dP after mz.
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Appendix B. Data
Table B.1: Cases with Competitor participation in Phase 2 EU
Type of Decision Case no. Year Rivals
Notification Heard
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.42 1990 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.43 1990 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.126 1991 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.12 1991 1
Art. 8(3) M.53 1991 0
Art. 8(2) M.68 1991 0
Art. 8(2) M.222 1992 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.214 1992 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.190 1992 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.291 1992 0
Art. 8(2) M.358 1993 0
Art. 8(2) M.315 1993 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.308 1993 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.468 1994 0
Art. 8(3) M.469 1994 0
Art. 8(2) M.269 1994 0
Art. 8(2) M.477 1994 1
Art. 8(2) M.484 1994 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.430 1994 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.582 1995 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.623 1995 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.553 1995 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.580 1995 0
Art. 8(3) M.490 1995 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.603 1995 0
Art. 8(3) M.619 1995 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.856 1996 0
Art. 8(3), Art. 8(4) M.784 1996 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.754 1996 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.737 1996 0
Art. 8(3) M.774 1996 0
Art. 8(2) M.794 1996 1
Art. 8(2) M.970 1997 0
Art. 8(3), Art. 8(4) M.890 1997 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1069 1997 1
Art. 8(2) M.1016 1997 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.950 1997 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.938 1997 1
Art. 8(3) M.993 1997 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.986 1997 0
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Table B.1 (continued)
Type of Decision Case no. Year Rivals
Notification Heard
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.942 1997 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.833 1997 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.877 1997 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.913 1997 0
Art. 8(3) M.1027 1997 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1313 1998 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1221 1998 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1225 1998 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1157 1998 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1673 1999 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1636 1999 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1663 1999 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1601 1999 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1693 1999 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1630 1999 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1383 1999 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1641 1999 0
Art. 8(3) M.1524 1999 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1532 1999 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1628 1999 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1671 1999 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1578 1999 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1439 1999 1
Art. 8(3) M.1672 1999 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1915 2000 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1845 2000 0
Art. 8(3) M.1741 2000 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1813 2000 1
Art. 8(2) M.1940 2000 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1853 2000 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2060 2000 1
Art. 8(2) M.2499 2000 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2033 2000 1
Art. 8(2) M.1879 2000 1
Art. 8(2) M.2498 2000 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.1806 2000 1
Art. 8(3) M.2097 2000 0
Art. 8(2) M.1882 2000 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2139 2000 1
Art. 8(4) M.2416 2001 0
Art. 8(2) M.2333 2001 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2533 2001 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2434 2001 0
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Table B.1 (continued)
Type of Decision Case no. Year Rivals
Notification Heard
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2530 2001 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2547 2001 1
Art. 8(2) M.2621 2001 0
Art. 8(2) M.2495 2001 0
Art. 8(3) M.2220 2001 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2568 2001 1
Art. 8(4) M.2283 2001 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2420 2001 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2389 2001 1
Art. 8(3) M.2187 2001 1
Art. 8(2) M.2314 2001 1
Art. 8(2) M.2201 2001 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2947 2002 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2903 2002 0
Art. 8(2) M.2706 2002 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2876 2002 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2698 2002 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2650 2002 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2861 2002 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2822 2002 1
Art. 8(2) M.3056 2003 0
Art. 8(2) M.3216 2003 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2978 2003 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.3083 2003 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.2972 2003 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.3099 2003 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.3431 2004 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.3436 2004 1
Art. 8(3) M.3440 2004 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.3916 2005 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.3868 2005 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.3796 2005 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.3653 2005 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.3687 2005 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.3696 2005 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.4187 2006 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.4000 2006 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.4404 2006 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.4180 2006 1
Art. 8(3) M.4439 2006 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.4381 2006 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.4525 2007 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.4504 2007 1
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Table B.1 (continued)
Type of Decision Case no. Year Rivals
Notification Heard
Art. 8(2) M.3333 2007 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.4726 2007 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.4513 2007 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.5153 2008 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.4980 2008 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.4919 2008 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.5046 2008 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.5335 2008 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.5440 2009 1
Art. 8(3) M.5830 2010 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.5658 2010 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.5675 2010 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.6266 2011 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.6203 2011 1
Art. 8(3) M.6166 2011 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.6286 2011 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.6497 2012 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.6576 2012 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.6471 2012 0
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.6690 2012 1
Art. 8(3) M.6663 2012 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.6410 2012 1
Art. 8(2) with conditions & obligations M.6458 2012 1
Art. 8(3) M.6570 2012 0
Table B.2: Competitor Participation as a share of Phase 2 cases
EU (Figure 1)
Year Sum Sum Sum Participation/
Notification Participation Phase 2 Sum Phase 2
1990 0 2 0
1991 2 4 .5
1992 0 4 0
1993 0 3 0
1994 1 6 .167
1995 0 7 0
1996 1 6 .167
1997 5 13 .385
1998 4 4 1
1999 12 15 .8
2000 12 15 .8
2001 10 16 .625
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2002 7 8 .875
2003 2 6 .333
2004 3 3 1
2005 6 6 1
2006 6 6 1
2007 5 5 1
2008 5 5 1
2009 1 1 1
2010 3 3 1
2011 4 4 1
2012 5 8 .625
Table B.3: Competitor objections as a share of Phase 2 cases with
competitor involvement EU (Figure 2)
Year Sum Sum Sum Objections/
Notification Participation Objections Sum Participation
1997 5 1 .2
1998 4 1 .25
1999 12 3 .25
2000 12 2 .167
2001 10 1 .1
2002 7 4 .571
2003 2 1 .5
2004 3 3 1
2005 6 6 1
2006 6 5 .833
2007 5 5 1
2008 5 5 1
2009 1 1 1
2010 3 3 1
2011 4 3 .75
2012 5 5 1
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